Foster Leonard v. State of Utah : Petition for Writ of Certiorari by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1992
Foster Leonard v. State of Utah : Petition for Writ of
Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; attorney general; Marian Decker; assistant attorney general; attorneys for
respondent.
Jose Trujillo; attorney for petitioner.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Leonard v. Utah, No. 920140.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/4083
r 
45.9 
.S9 
BRIEF 
•
S
 JcZe/i/o 
DOCKET NO. -yC_„. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FOSTER LEONARD, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court 
Case No. WoM 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 900560-CA 
Priority No. 13 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
JOSE TRUJILLO 
124 South 400 East, Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Petitioner 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
FI L 
MAR 1 1 1992 
CLERK SUPREMc COURT 
UTAH 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FOSTER LEONARD, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court 
Case No. 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 900560-CA 
Priority No. 13 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
JOSE TRUJILLO 
124 South 400 East, Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Petitioner 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
1. Whether the lower courts erred in characterizing this 
initial police-citizen encounter as a mere level two 
stop. 
2. Whether the State met its burden of showing that the 
stop was sufficiently justified and limited. 
3. Whether the defendant's constitutional rights were 
violated because probable cause was lacking for a de 
facto arrest. 
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 2 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
A. PROCEEDINGS BELOW 3 
B. FACTS 5 
1. What the officers knew 7 
2. What the officers did 9 
REASONS WHY QUESTIONS PRESENTED JUSTIFY ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT . 11 
A. QUESTION 1 11 
B. QUESTION 2 15 
C. QUESTION 3 17 
CONCLUSION 19 
1 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
page 
CASES CITED 
Commonwealth v. Sanderson. 
398 Mass. 761, 500 N.E.2d 1337 (1986) 14 
Dunaway v. New York. 
442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2254 (1979) 12 
Florida v. Rover. 
460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319 (1983) 13, 14, 15, 16 
Kraus v. County of Pierce. 
793 F.2d 1105, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 1986) 15 
Mapp v. Ohio. 
376 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) 11 
State v. Baird. 
763 P.2d 1214, 1217 (Utah App. 1988) 6, 12 
State v. Cornwall. 
810 P.2d 484, 488 (1981) 15 
State v. Deitman. 
739 P.2d 616,617-18 (Utah 1987) 12 
State v. Holmes. 
774 P.2d 506, 509 (Utah App. 1989) 17 
State v. Johnson, 
805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991) 12-13, 16, 18 
State v. Leonardf 
175 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Utah App. 1991) 2, 4, 15, 16 
State v. Mendoza, 
748 P. 2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987) 6 
State v. Sery. 
758 P.2d 935, 944 (Utah App. 1988) 17, 18 
State v. Sierra. 
754 P.2d 972, 977 (Utah App. 1988) 19 
Terry v. Ohio. 
392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) 11 
11 
United States v. Al-Azzawy. 
784 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1985), 
cert, denied. 476 U.S. 1144, 106 S.Ct. 2255 (1986) 16 
United States v. Delgadillo-Velasquezf 
856 F.2d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1988) 13 
United States v. Merritt. 
736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984) 12 
United States v. Pinion. 
800 F.2d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1986), 
cert, denied. 480 U.S. 936, 107 S.Ct. 1580 (1987) 15 
United States v. Robertson. 
833 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1987) 12 
United States v. Sokolow, 
831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987) 17 
United States v. Williamsf 
714 F.2d 777, 781 (8th Cir. 1983) 16 
STATUTES. RULES & CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 2, 11 
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, § 14 2, 11 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 48(a) & (e) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-8 (1990) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1990) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1990) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990) 3, 11 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3) (a) & (5) (Supp. 1990) 2 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure. § 9.2(d) & (f) 
(2d Ed. 1987 & Supp. 1992) 13, 14 
iii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
FOSTER LEONARD, 
Peti t:i one]::: , 
v. 
STATE OP UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court 
Case No. 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 900560-CA 
Priority No. 13 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the lower courts erred in characterizing as a mere 
"level-two stop" an initial police-citizen encounter in which the 
defendant's car was pulled over by three patrol cars carrying four 
police officers, at least three of whom got out of the cars and 
converged upon the defendant and his woman passenger; where it was 
"very possible" that the officers had their guns drawn, even though 
there was no evidence that the defendant or his passenger—who were 
then suspected of traffic violations and a possible purchase of 
drug equipment or precursor chemicals—were armed or dangerous, and 
the defendant voluntarily exited the car and walked towards the 
officers in a cooperative, non-violent manner; where the stop was 
made on a well-traveled freeway during daylight hours; where the 
defendant was forced to kneel by the side of the freeway with his 
hands in front of him; where the defendant's passenger was placed 
in one of the patrol cars for questioning; and where the defendant 
and his passenger were advised of their Miranda rights before being 
questioned. 
2. Whether the state met its burden of showing that the 
initial stop of the defendant was sufficiently justified and 
limited to satisfy the conditions of a "level-two stop,11 
Whether the defendant's rights under the fourth amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14, of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah were violated because probable 
cause was lacking for a de facto arrest. 
OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals' opinion and order denying rehearing are 
found in Appendix 1 to this petition. 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
On December 5, 1991, the Court of Appeals filed its opinion 
affirming the defendant's conviction. See, State v. Leonard, 175 
Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Utah App. 1991) . Counsel for the State 
nevertheless filed a Petition for Rehearing on December 18, 1991. 
The Court of Appeals denied the State's Petition on January 9, 
1992. 
Mr. Leonard retained new counsel and filed a timely motion for 
an extension of time until March 11, 1992, in which to file a 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The motion for an extension was 
granted by order dated February 11, 1992. Thus, this petition is 
timely under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 48(a) & (e) . 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this petition 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) & (5) (Supp. 1990). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The full text of the following provisions is contained in 
Appendix 3 to this petition: 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, § 14 
2 
Utah Code Ann- § 77-7-2 (1990) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Proceedings below 
Mr. Leonard was arraigned on drug-related charges in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County. He filed a motion 
to suppress evidence obtained from searches of his residence and 
the car he was driving. Judge George E. Bailiff conducted a 
hearing on the motion on August 29, 1989, and denied the motion in 
a Ruling dated October 19, 1989. (See, Appendix 2.) 
Mr. Leonard then entered a conditional plea of guilty to a 
charge of possessing equipment with intent to manufacture a 
controlled substance, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37C-8 
(1990) and a charge of conspiracy to manufacture a controlled 
substance, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1990). (R. 
44, 51, 65, 108-121, 151-158.) A final judgment of conviction was 
entered, and he was sentenced to not more than five years in prison 
and a $1,000 fine on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. 
(R. 187.) 
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Mr. Leonard contended 
that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He 
argued that: (1) his arrest was not based upon probable cause; (2) 
the search of the vehicle he was driving was not based on probable 
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cause; and (3) the search of his residence was tainted by the 
illegality of the arrest. See, State v. Leonard, Appendix 1 at 3. 
The first argument was directed not so much at the legality of 
the officers1 conduct when they later placed the defendant formally 
under arrest, but at the legality of the initial stop or seizure. 
On this issue, the appellate judges were in sharp disagreement. 
Judge Norman H. Jackson concluded "that there was an articulable 
suspicion which justified the stop of defendant's vehicle, and that 
therefore the level two seizure of defendant was reasonable." Id. 
at 6. 
Judge Gregory K. Orme agreed that the officers had the 
requisite articulable suspicion to warrant a level-two stop. 
However, "[g]iven the intrusive tactics employed by the 
investigating officers," he believed the initial seizure was a "de 
facto arrest requiring probable cause." Id. at 16 (J. Orme, 
dissenting). 
Judge Leonard H. Russon believed "probable cause to arrest 
Leonard existed at the time at which the officers stopped Leonard's 
vehicle." Id. at 15-16 (J. Russon, concurring). But as Judge Orme 
emphasized, the State itself did not "contend that there was 
probable cause to arrest defendant or subject him to anything more 
intrusive than a level-two Terry stop at the time the police 
officers effected the stop and asked their initial questions." 
Id. at 16 (J. Orme, dissenting). 
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B. Facts 
The trial court's Ruling contains the following findings 
fact pertinent to the initial stop: 
(1) From approximately May 1, 1989, law enforcement 
agencies had been conducting surveillance at Intertech 
Chemical in Orem, Utah. The surveillance has resulted in 
a number of arrests and convictions. 
(2) On July 20, 1989, Detective Terry Fox was conducting 
surveillance at Intertech. He noticed defendant Leonard 
in the parking lot wearing casual clothes and using what 
appeared to be a personal vehicle rather than a company 
vehicle. 
(3) Leonard behaved in a nervous manner. He purchased 
what looked to the detective to be glassware and 
chemicals and appeared to pay in cash. Defendants loaded 
the glassware and chemicals in to the vehicle and left 
the parking lot. 
(4) Detective Fox decided to follow the vehicle in order 
to identify its owner. As Fox attempted to follow the 
vehicle, another car swerved in front of Fox in an 
apparent attempt to disrupt his progress. It appeared to 
Fox that the defendants' vehicle was trying to evade 
pursuit. Fox noted reckless behavior on the part of the 
defendants as they turned to get on the freeway that 
nearly caused an accident. On the freeway, the 
defendants' accelerated to over 70 miles per hour in a 55 
miles per hour zone. 
(5) Detective Fox called for back up after a check 
through dispatch found no owner registered for either the 
plates of the defendants' vehicle nor for the vehicle 
that swerved in front of him. The vehicle was stopped 
without incident after the backup arrived. . . . 
(6) The Court finds that the stop made by the officers 
was appropriate and legal. Detective Fox had reasonable 
suspicion based on the circumstances taken as a whole. 
The defendants did not appear to be ordinary businessmen; 
they appeared to be nervous; they drove erratically; they 
used what appeared to be a personal vehicle; another car 
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seemed to be acting in concert with defendants in an 
attempt to block the detective's pursuit; dispatch could 
not identify [the] owner of the vehicle from the license 
plate number; the defendants were traveling more than 15 
miles per hour in excess of the speed limit; the list of 
items purchased given to the officers while in pursuit 
were indicative of illegal activity. All of these 
factors taken together could easily create a reasonable 
and articul[able] suspicion necessary to make an 
investigatory stop 
(7) Even before the officers began investigatory 
questioning which does not require it, defendants were 
given Miranda warnings. 
(Ruling at 1-4, Appendix 2.) 
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Mr. Leonard did not 
dispute the underlying facts so much as the subjective 
interpretations placed on those facts and the trial court's 
ultimate findings that the officers had the requisite justification 
for their conduct. 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion summarizes the pertinent facts 
in a section called "Background." Of these facts, as the Opinion 
correctly notes, "only facts known to the officers at the time they 
stopped defendant's vehicle are relevant" to the validity of the 
initial stop (Opinion at 6, n.3; emphasis in original). See, State 
v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987); State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 
1214, 1217 (Utah App. 1988). 
The following facts are also relevant and appear in the 
record: 
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1. What the officers knew 
Mr. Leonard's conduct at Intertech was observed by Officer 
Fox, who testified as follows: 
[The defendant and Ms. Garza] entered the business. They 
were driving a silver and blue Ford Bronco. When they 
entered the business, I noticed that they weren't dressed 
as typical businessmen, meaning Levis and Polo shirt. 
When they walked in the business I saw the male defendant 
here, Mr. Leonard, walk to the doorway, stand there in 
the doorway smoking a cigarette, keep pacing around, 
looking around as if scanning the parking lot area . . . 
As he scanned around, he finished his cigarette. 
I saw a female employee inside the business . . . set out 
cartons or containers. These cartons or containers had 
pictures on them in blue and black consistent with 
glassware boxes. They had pictures of flasks on them. 
I saw her set out gallon containers, some type of 
chemical. I couldn't tell what it was at that time. 
And then I saw Mr. Leonard continue to come to the 
doorway, look around. . . . 
Mr. Leonard continued to do what appeared to be 
surveillance. He lifted up his front shirt and appeared 
to be doing something down the front of his pants here, 
and then looked like to me he took a wallet from his 
pants . . . 
As he looked around, pretty soon these chemicals were 
loaded by the front doorway by the employees of 
Intertech. Mr. Leonard came out and got into this Bronco 
and drove it over by the front door. And he and Miss 
Garza loaded these chemicals into the back of the Bronco 
They both got into the Bronco and proceeded to leave the 
business. 
(T. 10-13.) 
Officer Fox thought the suspicious thing about Mr. Leonard and 
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Ms. Garzafs conduct was lf[j]ust the items being taken out." (T. 
30.) It was Mr. Leonard's appearance at a store that was under 
surveillance—not looking like a "legitimate businessman"— that 
aroused the officer's suspicion. He thought a "legitimate 
businessman" would instead "show up with something identifying his 
company, would look presentable, wouldn't scan the parking lot, 
reach down the front of his pants, wouldn't appear to be so 
nervous. Those type of things." (T. 28-29.) 
Officer Fox followed the Bronco for some time in his unmarked 
police car, all the way from Orem to approximately SR 92, north of 
Lehi. (T. 18, 37 & 52.) During this time, he observed several 
moving violations by Mr. Leonard: a failure to yield the right of 
way when turning left, two lane changes without signaling, and 
traveling about 70 miles per hour in a 55 mile zone. (T. 14, 16 & 
18.) Officer Fox thought these violations "bordered on reckless 
driving." (T. 35.) 
When Officer Fox ran a registration check on the Bronco, 
dispatch reported that the plates on the vehicle were not on file. 
(T. 15.) (It was later found, as Mr. Leonard told the officers at 
the time of the initial stop, that the Bronco was registered to his 
passenger, Ms. Garza. T. 43 & 67.) 
"[M]aybe 20 seconds prior to the stop," Officer Caldwell 
called Intertech to inquire what items had just been sold. (T. 33-
34 & 43). The officer.s determined that "[n]othing that they 
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purchased was illegal or regulated"—ff[i]t was a legal purchase." 
(T. 34-35)• 
2. What the officers did 
We now turn to the facts showing the intrusiveness of the 
encounter. As Judge Orme notes, "[l]ittle attention seems to have 
been given at the evidentiary hearing to what the police did in 
effecting the stop as opposed to what they knew in deciding to 
effect the stop." (Dissenting opinion, n.5.) However, the 
transcript of the hearing shows the following facts about the 
officersf conduct: 
Officer Fox called for back-up because "the past people we 
have dealt with have been felons, had extensive criminal histories 
—some of them for homicide—have been escapees from prison and 
were armed in these type of stops, I was concerned for my safety." 
(T. 17.) "The flags coming out the side windows1 was very unique, 
strange to me, and it kind of frightened me. So I continued to 
call for backup and assistance." Id. 
Two additional vehicles responded to the call. The vehicle 
that first approached the Bronco to make the stop carried two 
officers, Blackhurst and Caldwell. In the second vehicle .was 
Officer Greening. Officer Fox followed in a third vehicle. (T. 
1
 Apparently the "flags" were tied to the Bronco's seat belts 
and went up when the seat belts were fastened. (See, T. 37.) 
9 
18.) Thus, a total of four officers from three police cars 
effected the stop. (T. 33-34 & 38.) 
When the cars stopped, Officer Fox stepped out and joined 
Officers Caldwell and Blackhurst by the first car. (T. 19.) 
Officer Greening also exited his patrol vehicle and "maintained a 
secure position" there. (T. 52.) In the meantime, Mr. Leonard got 
out of the Bronco and started walking back towards them. Id. He 
identified himself and answered the officers' questions about the 
registration.2 (T. 67.) 
Officer Fox ordered Mr. Leonard to kneel down "so I could 
watch his hands and he wouldn't flee from me." (T. 19.) Then the 
officer ordered Ms. Garza to get out of the vehicle and to come 
back and kneel down as well. Id. They were kneeling in the 
emergency lane, on the north side of Lehi on 1-15 northbound. (T. 
18-19.) 
Officer Fox did not have his gun drawn but thought it was 
"very possible" that other officers did have their guns drawn. (T. 
39.) Officer Caldwell didn't have a gun but "hoped" that another 
of the officers pulled a gun when they got out of the car. (T. 
90.) 
Officer Caldwell took over. He ordered Mr. Leonard to the 
side of the road and advised him of his Miranda rights, then 
2
 At this point in time, the officers did not know whether 
the information Mr. Leonard gave them was true or false. 
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started asking what they were doing. (T. 19.) 
After interviewing Mr. Leonard and Ms. Garza for approximately 
15 minutes, the officers made a formal arrest and took them to the 
American Fork Police Department. (T. 20.) 
REASONS WHY THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
JUSTIFY ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT 
Question 1; Was this a "level-two stop" or a de facto arrest? 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution3 
requires that the "seizure" of a person be supported by "probable 
cause." A limited exception to this requirement was first 
recognized in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 
889 (1968) . Since the brief stop in Terry was less intrusive than 
an arrest, the United States Supreme Court held that probable cause 
was not necessary. However, the Court said the police officer must 
be able to point to "specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant that intrusion." 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880.4 
3
 The fourth amendment is applicable to the states through 
the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio. 376 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 
1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). 
Article I, Section 14, of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah, is similar in language to the fourth amendment. (See 
Appendix 3.) 
4
 Utah has codified the reasonable suspicion standard. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990). (See Appendix 3.) 
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This Court has explained that there are three levels of 
police-citizen encounters, each of which requires a different 
degree of justification to be constitutional: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime and pose 
questions so long as the citizen is not detained against 
his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an 
"articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or 
is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop"; 
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has 
probable cause to believe an offense has been committed 
or is being committed. 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987), quoting United 
States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984). "Any time a 
police officer stops an automobile the stop necessarily involves 
detention and therefore is [at least] a level two encounter . . ." 
State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1988). 
The stop in this case was even more intrusive. A level-two or 
Terry stop "involves no more than a brief stop, interrogation, and, 
under the proper circumstances, a brief check for weapons." United 
States v. Robertson> 833 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1987). Anything 
beyond such a brief and narrowly-defined intrusion constitutes a de 
facto arrest, and probable cause is required. See id.; Dunaway v. 
New York. 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2254 (1979). 
As this Court held in State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 
(Utah 1991) , the "length and scope of the detention must be 
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'strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered 
its initiation permissible.111 For a stop to be "constitutionally 
permissible upon less than probable cause, it must be appropriately 
limited as to length and the investigative techniques employed." 
3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 9.2(f) (2d Ed. 1987 & Supp. 
1992) (emphasis added). 
In Florida v. Royer. 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319) (1983), the 
purported Terry stop of a suspect at an airport lasted only 15 
minutes, but the four-Justice plurality found it to be 
insufficiently limited—an illegal arrest. "[A] Terry stop can 
become an arrest (& consequently an illegal one if probable cause 
is not then present) if it now appears that the police could have 
utilized some other means of investigation which it is believed 
would have been less intrusive." LaFave, supra, § 9.2(f). 
If the show of force and detention used in the context of a 
purported Terry stop are "indistinguishable from police conduct in 
an arrest," the seizure is invalid. United States v. Delaadillo-
Velasguez, 856 F.2d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1988) (Terry stop of 
suspected drug dealers was invalid where police approached with 
guns drawn, ordered the suspects to lie down in the street, and 
handcuffed them). Thus, police may not, as a matter of routine, 
utilize methods in the course of a valid Terry stop which might 
commonly be employed incident to arrest. LaFave, supraf § 9.2(d) 
at 366. 
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The methods used by the officers in this case are commonly 
employed in an arrest: ordering a suspect to kneel, confining a 
suspect in the patrol car for interrogation, and informing the 
suspect of Miranda rights. 
There was also an unusual showing of force and authority. 
Three officers and four patrol cars effected the arrest of Mr. 
Leonard and his sole passenger, a young woman. It is likely that 
guns were drawn on them. The present case is an example of those 
"circumstances in which the police presence is so overpowering as 
to be 'inconsistent with a brief Terry-type stop 'to determine [the 
defendant's] identification or to maintain a status quo.'" See 
LaFave, supra, § 9.2(d) (Supp. 1992); Commonwealth v. Sanderson, 
398 Mass. 761, 500 N.E.2d 1337 (1986) (deeming assemblage of six 
officers and a police dog an arrest rather than a Terry stop). 
Of course, police may use force or other exceptional methods 
during a Terry stop when such measures are reasonably necessary for 
their safety and protection. But even then, the officers must 
employ the least intrusive means reasonably available to effect the 
purpose of the stop. See, Florida v. Royer, 103 S.Ct. at 1325. 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion in this case conflicts with its 
earlier pronouncement that: 
A person is under arrest for fourth amendment purposes 
when, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would 
have believed he was not free to leave. 
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State v. Cornwall, 810 P.2d 484, 488 (1981), quoting Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. at 502, 103 S.Ct. at 1326-27. Federal courts have 
also held that a level-two stop evolves into a level-three arrest 
when, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable, innocent 
person in the suspect's place would believe himself to be under 
arrest. See, United States v. Pinion, 800 F.2d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 
1986), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 936, 107 S.Ct. 1580 (1987). 
As Judge Orme pointed out, a reasonable, innocent person in 
Mr. Leonard's place would have believed himself to be under arrest: 
The police converged on defendant in three separate cars. 
The initial confrontation was somewhat hostile despite 
defendant's passivity, and may well have included a show 
of weapons by one or more officers. Defendant was 
ordered to his knees at the side of the highway, while 
his female companion was placed in the back of a police 
vehicle. Defendant was then informed of his Miranda 
rights. It is unlikely that, at this point in the 
encounter, a reasonable person in defendant's position 
would believe his seizure to be less than a level-three 
custodial one. 
State v. Leonard, Appendix 1 (J. Orme, dissenting, n. 6) (emphasis 
added). See also, Kraus v. County of Pierce. 793 F.2d 1105, 1108-
09 (9th Cir. 1986) (where officers turned spotlights on the 
defendant, drew their weapons, and ordered the suspects to drop to 
their knees, a reasonable person would have believed himself under 
arrest). 
Question 2; Did the State meet its burden of proof? 
The State did not provide additional evidence that would 
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justify the intrusive methods used by the police in this encounter. 
"The officers did not frisk defendant, or otherwise attempt to 
discern if he was carrying a weapon. This strongly suggests that, 
once defendant had been stopped and exited his car, the officers 
did not suspect he was armed." State v. Leonard, Appendix 1 (J. 
Orme, dissenting, n.4). "Other circumstances of the stop—the 
highway locale, the presence of four officers, the non-violent 
nature of the suspected offense, and defendant's non-furtive 
attempt to approach the police vehicles—also indicate the 
situation was not potentially dangerous, and that intrusive tactics 
were inappropriate." Id. 
The State has the burden to show that a seizure it seeks to 
justify was limited to the conditions of a level-two stop. See, 
State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991) (reviewing on writ of 
certiorari an officer's basis for the level-two stop of a motor 
vehicle and finding that the extent of intrusion on the passenger 
was not justified); United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 894 
(9th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1144, 106 S.Ct. 2255 
(1986); United States v. Williams, 714 F.2d 777, 781 (8th Cir. 
1983), quoting Florida v. Royer, 103 S.Ct. at 1325-26. 
The State failed to meet its burden in this case. See, State 
v. Leonard, (J. Orme, dissenting, n.5). Therefore, the denial of 
Mr. Leonard's suppression motion should have been reversed and the 
matter remanded to the trial court with instructions to permit 
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withdrawal of his guilty plea. 
Question 3; Was probable cause lacking? 
Even when considered in their totality, the facts of record 
which were known to the officers at the time of the initial stop 
would not amount to the "probable cause" necessary for an encounter 
more intrusive than a level-two stop. 
In a prior decision, the Court of Appeals has explained that: 
Although the government may present a lengthy list of 
detailed observations, the courts are not relieved of 
their duty to review the list critically and decide 
whether each particular observation cited actually 
contributes something to the "whole picture"—that is, 
whether the particular observation bears any reasonable 
correlation to a suspicion that the person presently is 
engaged in criminal activity. 
State v. Sery. 758 P.2d 935, 944 (Utah App. 1988), quoting United 
States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987). A 
fortiori, a list of factors said to support a finding of probable 
cause must be reviewed critically. 
The trial court's first finding was that Intertech was under 
surveillance, resulting in a number of arrests and convictions. 
However, the Court of Appeals had previously declared that "an 
area's reputation for criminal activity should not be imputed to an 
individual." State v. Holmes. 774 P.2d 506, 509 (Utah App. 1989). 
Officer Fox's observations of Mr. Leonard at Intertech have 
little bearing. "Scanning or "looking around" is not such unusual 
17 
behavior that it would support a finding of reasonable suspicion, 
much less "probable cause." See, Sery, 758 P.2d at 944. Wearing 
Levis and a Polo shirt is not suggestive of criminal activity. Nor 
is driving a personal rather than a company car. 
The Court of Appeals had pointed out in an earlier case that 
"nervousness" is a highly subjective characteristic. "An officer's 
mere conclusion regarding defendant's nervousness, unsupported by 
relevant objective facts, can have no weight in determining if he 
had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." Sery, 758 P.2d 
at 944-45. 
The State never showed that the occupants of the Datsun that 
swerved in front of Officer Fox had any connection to Mr. Leonard. 
The list of purchased items which Intertech gave to the 
officers while they were in pursuit, was not necessarily indicative 
of illegal activity. The list showed that glassware and chemicals, 
whose purchase was not illegal or regulated but could be used in 
the manufacture of a controlled substance, had been purchased. 
Finally, the problem of an apparent lack of registration for 
the Bronco should have been quickly dispelled with the information 
that it was registered in the name of the passenger, Ms. Garza. 
The lack of a registration certificate and the fact that the 
occupants did not own the car did not rise even to the level of an 
articulable suspicion that a crime had been committed, in State v. 
Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991). Such "facts are just as 
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consistent with the more likely scenario that the driver borrowed 
the car from its rightful owner." Id. at 764. 
"The fact that [a police officer's] 'hunch' proved correct is 
perhaps a tribute to his policeman's intuition, but it is not 
sufficient to justify, ex post facto. a seizure that was not 
objectively reasonable at its inception." State v. Sierra, 754 
P.2d 972, 977 (Utah App. 1988). 
CONCLUSION 
The controversial nature of this case, and the need for 
guidance to state trial courts and police officers, is reflected in 
the three divergent opinions entered by the three judges of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
The main opinion did not apply the Court of Appeals' own test 
for the occurrence of an arrest, a test which is also applied by 
federal courts. The Court did not hold the State to its burden of 
justifying the extent of the officers' intrusion, nor did it follow 
its own advice to review the list of the officers' observations 
critically. 
For all these reasons, Mr. Leonard asks this Court to grant a 
writ of certiorari on the questions presented in his petition. 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
Defendant Foster Leonard appeals from his conviction for 
possession of equipment with intent to manufacture a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37C-8 (1990), and for conspiracy to manufacture a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-4-201 (1990) and 58-37-8 (1990). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
From approximately May 1, 1989, to when the present facts 
occurred, law enforcement agencies had been conducting 
surveillance at Intertech Chemical in Orem, Utah. The 
surveillance had resulted in several arrests and convictions 
relating to the possession and manufacture of controlled 
substances, specifically methamphetamine. On July 20, 1989, 
Police Officer Terry Fox was conducting surveillance at 
Intertech. He noticed defendant and April Garza in the parking 
lot. Both were dressed in clothing "not typical of 
business[people]," and looked nervous. Defendant went into 
Intertech and came out carrying a box of what appeared to be 
glassware and chemicals. Defendant loaded the box into a Ford 
Bronco, and drove away from the parking lot with Garza. Fox 
decided to follow the vehicle in order to identify its owner. 
As Fox proceeded out of the parking lot in his unmarked 
vehicle, a Datsun truck swerved in front of him. Fox testified 
that he thought the driver of the Datsun was trying to block him 
from pursuing defendant's vehicle. Fox continued to follow 
defendant, who drove recklessly onto the freeway. Defendant's 
vehicle accelerated to over seventy miles per hour and made 
several illegal lane changes, according to Fox. Fox also 
observed cefendant putting bandanna-type flags out both windows 
of the Bronco, apparently to signal the occupants of the Datsun. 
Fox attempted to find out who owned the vehicle he was pursuing, 
but the police dispatcher found no owner registered for the 
license plates on defendant's vehicle. The Datsun similarly had 
no registered owner. 
Fox testified that he decided to stop defendant for the 
traffic violations he had witnessed. Thinking that he might be 
in danger, Fox called for assistance. Three other police 
officers eventually assisted Fox in stopping defendant. One of 
those, Detective Gary Caldwell, learned from Intertech that 
defendant and his companion had purchased glassware and a 
chemical. None of the items purchased were controlled 
substances, but all were commonly used in the manufacture of 
methamphetamine. Caldwell testified that he made the decision to 
stop the vehicle based on his belief that defendant was in 
possession of drug paraphernalia and controlled substances. 
When defendant's vehicle was pulled over, the officers had 
defendant and Garza get out of the vehicle and kneel down on the 
side of the freeway. Under Caldwell's direction, Officer Sean 
Greening placed Garza in his vehicle and asked her name, address, 
and birthdate. Garza produced an Oregon driver's license. 
Greening testified that he also advised Garza she did not have to 
answer his questions. Garza asked why she was being stopped, to 
which Greening replied "for possession of drug paraphernalia.11 
Garza then explained to Greening that someone had paid her and 
defendant to purchase the items, and that they were to deliver 
the items to a motel room. 
Meanwhile, Caldwell asked defendant for a driver's license 
and vehicle registration. Defendant had no identification and 
told Caldwell the vehicle belonged to Garza. Defendant then gave 
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Caldwell the name "Scott Leonard" and a birthdate which was later 
determined to be false. Caldwell testified he advised defendant 
of his constitutional rights and defendant consented to answering 
some questions. Caldwell then proceeded to question defendant as 
to what he was doing in Utah County. Defendant told Caldwell 
that he had come to Utah County to purchase the items for 
someone, and that he could not tell Caldwell who that was, 
because defendant would get in trouble. Caldwell also testified 
that he could see a box in the back of the Bronco, and that the 
box contained the items Intertech had told him defendant had 
purchased. 
Because the stories given by defendant and Garza were 
different, and because he knew what items defendant had purchased 
at Intertech, Caldwell arrested defendant and Garza. Defendant 
and Garza were transported to the American Fork Police Department 
and both were questioned by Caldwell. Eventually Caldwell 
determined the exact address of the apartment which defendant and 
Garza shared, and a search warrant of the premises was obtained, 
based on Caldwell's affidavit. 
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in the 
warrantless search of the Bronco and in the warrant search of his 
apartment, claiming that the officers did not have probable cause 
to initiate the stop of his vehicle. The trial court denied his 
motion. Defendant then entered a conditional plea of guilty 
pursuant to this court's decision in State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 
938 (Utah App. 1988), and this appeal followed. 
Before this court, defendant appeals the denial of his 
motion to suppress, claiming that the evidence was illegally 
obtained. Specifically, defendant claims that his arrest was not 
based on probable cause; that the search of the Bronco was not 
based on probable cause; and that the search of his residence was 
tainted by the illegality of the arrest. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Our review of findings of fact underlying a trial court's 
decision on a motion to suppress is governed by the "clearly 
erroneous" standard, State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 133 (Utah 
App. 1991), because the trial court is in an advantageous 
position to determine the factual basis underlying such a motion, 
"The trial court's finding is clearly erroneous only if it is 
against the clear weight of the evidence . . . .,f State v. Serv, 
758 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah App. 1988). 
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LEGALITY OF THE INITIAL STOP 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
Requires that all seizures of an individual be based on probable 
cause.1 The United States Supreme Court first explicitly 
permitted a seizure of an individual upon less than probable 
cause in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). The 
Terry Court held that a police officer must be able to point to 
"specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion." 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. The reasonable 
suspicion standard is codified at Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 
(1990): 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
"Stressing that each case must be decided upon its own facts, the 
Terry court concluded that the limited stop and frisk was 
justified where ya police officer observes unusual conduct which 
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his [or her] 
experience that criminal activity is afoot . . . .'" State v. 
Sery, 758 P.2d 938, 941 (Utah App. 1988) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884). Thus, a temporary detention or 
seizure is justified when there is an articulable suspicion that 
1. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, with our emphasis: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
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an individual has committed or is about to commit a crime. See 
id. (quoting Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S. Ct. 
1319, 1324 (1983) (plurality opinion)). This court has further 
refined the Terry reasonable suspicion test, concluding that a 
''brief investigatory stop must be based on * objective facts' that 
the * individual is involved in criminal activity.'" State v. 
Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted). 
The State argues that several facts support the conclusion 
that the officers in the present case had a reasonable suspicion 
that criminal activity was afoot, and that therefore the stop of 
defendant was justified. Intertech had been under surveillance 
for selling drug paraphernalia; defendant's behavior was 
suspiciously inconsistent with that of a legitimate businessman; 
defendant purchased several items from Intertech which are 
commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine; defendant 
2. Of course, no suspicion is required when a police officer 
merely makes an inquiry of an individual in the context of a 
wholly voluntary encounter. The Utah Supreme Court has 
determined that there are three levels of police-citizen 
encounters, each of which requires a different degree of 
justification to be constitutionally permissible: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that 
the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the "detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop"; 
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the 
officer has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is being 
committed. 
State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) 
(quoting United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 
1984)). "The stopping of a vehicle and the consequent detention 
of its occupants constitute a level two xseizure' within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment, even if the purpose of the stop 
is limited and the resulting detention brief." State v. Steward, 
806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Sierra, 754 
P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App. 1988)). In our case, it is not disputed 
that a level two stop occurred. 
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left Intertech in an unregistered vehicle; some person in a 
Datsun tried to prevent the officers from pursuing defendant; 
defendant displayed bandannas from the windows of his vehicle in 
an apparent attempt to signal the occupants of the Datsun; and 
defendant drove erratically and illegally on the freeway, 
apparently engaging in evasive tactics.3 
We agree that there was an articulable suspicion which 
justified the stop of defendant's vehicle, and that therefore the 
level two seizure of defendant was reasonable.4 While defendant 
contends that the officers had no evidence that a crime had been 
committed, we note that the officers were not only entitled, but 
probably required, to obtain more information when they 
reasonably suspected a crime had been committed. See State v. 
Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah), cert, denied. 434 U.S. 971, 
98 S. Ct. 523 (1977); Holmes. 774 P.2d at 508. We hold, 
therefore, that defendant was constitutionally stopped and 
briefly detained, and that the trial court's determination that 
the requisite reasonable suspicion existed was not clearly 
erroneous. 
ARREST OF DEFENDANT AND SEARCH OF VEHICLE 
Having determined that the initial seizure of defendant was 
lawful, we must determine if the subsequent arrest and search 
were lawful. Defendant argues that the police officers lacked 
probable cause to arrest him, or to conduct a warrantless search 
of the vehicle in which he was riding. The trial court found 
that the arrest of defendant was based on probable cause because 
the chemicals and equipment found in the vehicle were commonly 
3. The State also lists as support for the contention that the 
stop of defendant was based on a reasonable suspicion, several 
facts which occurred after defendant had been stopped. Of 
course, only facts known to the officers at the time they stopped 
defendants vehicle are relevant. See State v. Baird, 7 63 P.2d 
1214, 1217 (Utah App. 1988). See also State v. Mendoza, 748 P-2d 
181, 183 (Utah 1987). 
4. While Fox testified that he originally planned to stop 
defendant for traffic violations, it is clear from the record that 
Caldwell, who took charge of the situation once he was contacted by 
Fox, stopped defendant's vehicle for the purpose of ascertaining 
who defendant was, and for what purpose the glassware and chemicals 
had been purchased from Intertech. 
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used together in the manufacture of methamphetamine, and because 
testimony revealed that only one specialized piece of glassware 
and some chemicals were lacking to make the illegal substance. 
As to the search of defendant's vehicle,5 the trial court found 
that there was probable cause based on the list of items 
purchased from intertech received while the officers were in 
pursuit, the suspicious behavior of defendant, and "all attendant 
circumstances."6 However, the court's ruling does not indicate 
which exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment it was relying upon in justifying the warrantless 
search. 
The Arrest 
As to the legality of the arrest, Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 
(1990) provides authority for peace officers to make an arrest 
with or without a warrant. Reasonable cause for arrest without a 
warrant was defined by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 495 P.2d 1259 (1972): "The 
determination should be made on an objective standard: whether 
5. We refer to the vehicle which defendant was driving as 
"defendant's vehicle," but we note that the vehicle actually 
belonged to passenger Garza. 
6. The State does not argue that defendant, because he was not 
the owner of the vehicle, has no standing to challenge the search 
of the vehicle. Therefore, we do not reach the question of 
whether defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
vehicle. 
Prior to State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), our 
supreme court never required the issue of standing to be raised 
by the parties in the trial court or on appeal. "Standing is an 
issue that a court can raise sua sponte at any time." State v. 
Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, U.S. 
, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990). Rather, that court reached the 
issue regardless of whether or not a party had raised it. See 
State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Utah 1987) (per 
curiam); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984); State 
v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441, 443 (Utah 1978). In Schlosser, 
however, the court held that standing to challenge the validity 
of a search is not a jurisdictional doctrine, and, as such, that 
issue is waived if not raised before the trial court by the 
parties. Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1138-39. But see Schlosser, 791 
P.2d at 1139-41 (Howe, J., dissenting) (two justices would sua 
sponte raise issue of standing). 
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from the facts known to the officer, and the inferences which 
fairly might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person 
in his position would be justified in believing that the suspect 
had committed the offense." Id. at 1260 (citations omitted). 
See also State v. Avalar 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah App.), cert. 
denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). 
The arresting officer, Caldwell, testified that he 
questioned defendant regarding his presence in Utah County and 
the purchase from Intertech. Only after defendant gave a false 
name and birthdate, could provide no plausible explanation for 
the purchase, and would not tell Caldwell who had paid him to 
make the purchase, did Caldwell effectuate an arrest. 
These facts, taken together with the evasive tactics engaged 
in by defendant when the officers were pursuing him, the fact 
that the officers knew exactly what defendant had purchased from 
Intertech based on the list of items received while in pursuit, 
and the fact that the items found in defendants vehicle were 
commonly used together in the manufacture of methamphetamine, 
warranted arresting defendant. Accordingly, we cannot say that 
the trial court's finding of probable cause was an erroneous one. 
The dissent takes issue with the tactics employed by the 
officers in effectuating a level two stop, concluding that a de 
facto arrest actually occurred. Admittedly, if defendant had 
been arrested immediately upon being stopped by the officers, 
probable cause would have to be established at that point, and 
not after Caldwell interviewed defendant. While many courts have 
addressed the issue of when a seizure occurs,7 the cases are less 
clear on when an arrest occurs. The United States Supreme Court 
has acknowledged that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish an 
investigative stop from a de facto arrest. See United States v. 
Sharoe. 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985). There 
7. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of 
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen 
may we conclude that a seizure has occurred. Terry v. Ohio, 3 92 
U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (1968). See also Immigration and 
Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216-17, 104 S. Ct. 
1758, 1763 (1984) (intimidating circumstances surrounding police 
questioning result in Fourth Amendment seizure); United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980) 
(person is seized when, "in view of all of the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed 
that he was not free to leave"). 
900560-CA 8 
is no "litmus-paper test for . . . determining when a seizure 
exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop[,]M Florida v. Rover, 
460 U.S. 491, 506, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1329 (1983), and becomes an 
arrest. Rather, the determination usually depends upon the 
reasonableness of the stop under the circumstances. Two factors, 
whether there was a proper basis for the stop, and whether the 
degree of intrusion was reasonably related to the facts and 
circumstances at hand, are determinative of reasonableness. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S. Ct. at 1878-79; United States v. 
Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 356 (6th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 479 
U.S. 1097, 107 S. Ct. 1318 (1987). While the dissent does not 
dispute there was a reasonable basis for the stop, it does take 
issue with tactics employed by the officers. In reaching our 
conclusion that a proper level two stop was effectuated in this 
case, a review of cases which have addressed this question is 
useful to illustrate that no arrest took place. 
The dissent is correct in acknowledging one exception to the 
general proscription against intrusive police conduct: police 
are permitted to use a show of force or other exceptional methods 
during a Terry stop when such measures are reasonably necessary 
for the protection and safety of the investigating officers. The 
mere use or display of force in making a stop will not 
necessarily convert a stop into an arrest. United States v. 
Greene, 783 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 
1185, 106 S. Ct. 2923 (1986); United States v. White. 648 F.2d 
29, 34 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 924, 102 S. Ct. 424 
(1981). See also Adams v. Williams. 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S. Ct. 
1921, 1923 (1972) (police officers making a reasonable 
investigatory stop should not be denied the opportunity to 
protect themselves from possible attack); United States v. Lego, 
855 F.2d 542, 545 (8th Cir. 1988) (officer can point a gun at 
suspect without transforming investigative stop into arrest); 
United States v. Trullo, 809 F.2d 108, 113 (1st Cir.) (because 
"officer suspected appellant of dealing in narcotics, a pattern 
of criminal conduct rife with deadly weapons," display of weapon 
justified), cert, denied, 482 U.S. 916, 107 S. Ct. 3191 (1987); 
United States v. Eisenbura. 807 F.2d 1446, 1451 (8th Cir. 1986) 
(experienced police officers acted reasonably in drawing weapons 
in investigative stop of suspected narcotics dealer). 
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We recognize that the officers' conduct, ordering defendant 
to kneel at the side of the road, was intrusive.8 If weapons 
were drawn, the conduct is even more intrusive.9 Certainly such 
conduct would not be warranted if the surrounding circumstances 
did not give rise to a justifiable fear for personal safety. 
United States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 357 (6th Cir. 1986). 
However in this case, there was justification. While the dissent 
acknowledges that certain situations merit officers approaching a 
suspect with their weapons drawn, or ordering a suspect to lie on 
the ground, the dissent argues that in this case, such actions 
were not warranted because the police never determined whether 
defendant had a weapon, and there was no indication that 
defendant was dangerous. However, that conclusion is based on 
faulty assumptions. 
8. Focusing on whether or not requiring a driver to step out of 
his or her vehicle exceeds the scope of a Terry stop, the Supreme 
Court has concluded that "[w]hat is at most a mere inconvenience 
cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate concerns for the 
officer's safety." Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S. 
Ct. 330 (1977). See also United States v. Lego, 855 F.2d 542, 
545 (8th Cir. 1988) (officer's confining suspect in police car 
within scope of investigative stop); United States v. Manbeck, 
744 F.2d 360, 377-78 (4th Cir. 1984) (upholding reasonableness of 
investigative stop where police ordered the suspect to take a 
seat in the police car), cert, denied. 469 U.S. 1217, 105 S. Ct. 
1197 (1985). Also, as the dissent points out, police may require 
a suspect to lie on the ground. See, e.g., United States v. 
Buffington, 815 F.2d 1292, 1300 (9th Cir. 1987). 
9. There is nothing in the record that supports the dissent's 
conclusion that defendant was not violent or armed. In fact, 
quite the opposite can be assumed given the facts recited above. 
On similar facts, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it 
was reasonable to assume that a suspected narcotics dealer was 
armed and dangerous. United States v. Salas. 879 F.2d 53 0, 53 5 
(9th Cir.) (erratic and evasive driving by defendants and reports 
of drug materials in defendants' motel room gave police 
reasonable suspicion that defendants were armed), cert, denied, 
493 U.S. 979, 110 S. Ct. 507 (1989); see also United States v. 
Post, 607 F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 1979) (M[i]t is not 
unreasonable to assume that a dealer in narcotics might be 
armed"). 
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First, the record does not indicate whether or not defendant 
was frisked• Two of the officers who testified gave different 
accounts of what transpired after defendant's vehicle was 
stopped. 
Second, the record does indicate that the officers thought 
defendant was dangerous and could be carrying a weapon- Officer 
Fox testified that he became fearful when bandannas were put 
outside the windows of defendant's car. He decided to call for 
back-up officers to stop defendant's car when the bandannas 
appeared, and when he saw the cream-colored Datsun following him. 
"I felt it was a chase car, an assistance car," Fox testified, 
"and I was again fearful that I needed to have enough help to 
stop this vehicle so I wouldn't get hurt-" In addition, Fox 
stated that when he sees an unregistered vehicle, he immediately 
gives it more caution. Officer Greening, who also testified at 
the suppression hearing, stated that he was called to assist in a 
stop for drug paraphernalia, and that he has been informed in 
past circumstances that "these people could be dangerous, and 
thats why [he] was there to assist." Greening went on to say 
that officers, including himself, were often called to assist on 
DUI's and regular traffic stops, and "whenever an officer may 
feel he is in danger," and that it was his belief in dealing with 
people who were involved with drugs that "[t]hey have been 
convicted criminals and in the possession of firearms." We find 
abundant support in the record that the officers believed 
defendant could be armed or dangerous, and not, as the dissent 
suggests, that the police had nothing more than a hunch that 
defendant might be dangerous. Therefore, the officers' actions 
were not unreasonable to insure their safety. 
The dissent points to defendant being read his Miranda 
rights as further indication that an arrest took place. In 
Berkemer v. McCarty. 468 U.S. 420, 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984), the 
Supreme Court held that Miranda warnings were not required when a 
defendant is subjected to questioning during a routine traffic 
stop. The Court pointed to the circumstances around a traffic 
stop and compared them to stationhouse interrogation, "which 
frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware 
that questioning will continue until he provides his 
interrogators the answers they seek." Td. at 448, 104 S. Ct. at 
3149 (citations omitted). Given that traffic stops occur in 
public, and that they are relatively brief, the Court concluded 
that "persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not 
'in custody' for the purposes of Miranda." Id. at 440, 104 S. 
Ct. at 3150. The Court, however, also noted that police "could 
ensure compliance with the law by giving the full Miranda 
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warnings." Id. at 431 n.13, 104 S. Ct at 3145-46 n.13.10 That 
is exactly what took place here. 
In the present case, defendant was detained briefly on the 
side of the highway. The officers interrogated defendant. 
Defendant was arrested after he gave the officers false 
information, and had no plausible explanation for the Intertech 
purchase. Given the circumstances facing the officers, we 
conclude that they pursued their investigation in a diligent and 
reasonable manner, and that the methods employed were not 
excessive. 
The Search 
Admittedly, the search of defendant's vehicle conducted 
without a warrant is unreasonable per se unless it falls within a 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. See State v. 
Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Utah App. 1989). The State, 
acknowledging that the trial court did not rely upon a specific 
exception, claims that the search was justified pursuant to the 
automobile exception. 
While an individual has a lesser expectation of privacy in a 
vehicle as opposed to in his or her home, the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment still applies. See State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 
1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 
390-93, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2068-70 (1985)). In Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925), the Supreme Court 
determined that a warrantless search of an automobile was 
10. in United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1982), 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that while officers are 
not required to give Miranda warnings every time they question a 
suspect, "Miranda warnings are necessary even during a Terry stop 
if the suspect has been taken into custody or if the questioning 
takes place in a police dominated or compelling atmosphere-ff Id. 
at 1291 (citing United States v. Wilson, 666 F.2d 1241, 1247 (9th 
Cir. 1982); United States v. Harris, 611 F.2d 170, 172 {6th Cir-
1979)); United States v. Hickman, 523 F.2d 323, 327 (9th Cir. 
1975), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 1050, 96 S. Ct. 778 (1976). 
Compare United States v. Baron, 860 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(police exceeded scope of investigative stop by ordering 
defendant not to touch anything or say anything, and thirty-five 
minutes later confined her to a small room for questioning), 
cert, denied, 490 U.S. 1040, 109 S. Ct. 1944 (1989). 
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permissible if the officers have probable cause to believe the 
automobile contains either contraband or evidence of a crime and 
that they may be lost if not immediately seized. Id. at 151-52; 
see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806-07, 102 S. Ct. 
2157 (1982); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 
1978-80 (1970); United States v. Mendoza, 722 F.2d 96, 100 (5th 
Cir. 1983); State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1087-88 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Christensen. 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Dronebura, 781 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah App. 1989) (citing Carroll, 
267 U.S. at 132); State v. Holmes. 774 P.2d 506, 512 n.6 (Utah 
App. 1989). Thus, where as here, a vehicle is lawfully stopped 
based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, a 
warrantless search is justified where the officers have probable 
cause to believe contraband is contained in the vehicle. 
"The determination of whether probable cause exists . . . 
depends upon an examination of all the information available to 
the searching officer in light of the circumstances as they 
existed at the time the search was made." State v, Dorsey, 731 
P.2d at 1088 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 
176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1311 (1949)). Probable cause for a 
warrantless search has been found to exist on facts similar to 
those in the present case. In Mendoza, drug enforcement agents 
conducted surveillance of a residence, and also followed 
individuals who had contact with the suspect who resided there. 
The agents observed several of these individuals driving "in a 
manner calculated to elude surveillance," Mendoza, 722 F.2d at 
101, using pay telephones, and making several trips to and from a 
warehouse. While the court said that these facts may be 
consistent with innocent behavior, the totality of the 
circumstances justified a warrantless search of the suspects' 
vehicles. Id. at 101-02. 
Similarly, in Dorsey, our supreme court upheld a warrantless 
search of an automobile where a police officer who was assisting 
other officers involved in an undercover narcotics purchase, 
followed defendant's truck and eventually stopped him. The court 
found that because the officer knew that a controlled narcotics 
purchase had been attempted; that two of the individuals had left 
the motel room where the negotiations were taking place; that 
someone involved in the transaction had on a dark leather jacket; 
and that defendant was wearing a dark leather jacket, probable 
cause existed. Dorsey, 731 P.2d at 1089. 
Reviewing all of the information available to the officers 
in the present case, we hold that there was probable cause to 
justify the search. Officers Caldwell and Fox both testified 
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that they observed drug paraphernalia and chemicals in plain view 
in the vehicle.11 The officers also testified that defendant 
could not explain why he purchased the items, or for whom they 
were purchased. While the officers7 information at the time of 
the search might not be sufficient by itself to establish guilt, 
it was sufficient to establish probable cause. See id. 
Therefore, the trial court7s determination that probable cause 
existed for the search was not erroneous. 
VALIDITY OF THE SEARCH WARRANT 
Defendant's last claim is that the affidavit in support of 
the warrant to search his apartment contained nothing from which 
a detached and neutral magistrate could conclude that the 
apartment contained evidence of a crime. It is well established 
that a finding of "probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation" is required for the issuance of a search warrant. 
State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 285 (Utah App. 1990) (citation 
11. This testimony raises an interesting question in that none 
of the officers testified that they actually conducted a search 
of defendant's vehicle, only that they had seen the box 
containing the Intertech purchase on the back seat. Although not 
briefed or raised by the State, a second exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is the plain view exception. 
Determining whether the plain view exception applies requires 
application of a three-pronged test: (1) the officer7s presence 
must be lawful; (2) the evidence must be in plain view; and (3) 
the evidence must clearly be incriminating. State v. Holmes, 774 
P.2d 506, 510 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted). 
It is clear that in the present case, the officers7 presence 
was lawful. We have already established there was reasonable 
suspicion to stop defendant7s vehicle. It is also clear from the 
record that the box containing the glassware and chemicals was 
clearly visible in the back seat of the vehicle. As for the 
third prong, "clearly incriminating" has been defined as 
"probable cause to associate the property with criminal 
activity." State v. Kelly. 718 P.2d 385, 390 (Utah 1986) 
(quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-42, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 
1543 (1983) (plurality opinion)). In this case, there is 
evidence to suggest that the contents of the box were associated 
with criminal activity because all of the items purchased are 
used in the manufacture of illegal substances, and are rarely 
purchased in combination for any other purpose. Thus, all of the 
requirements for the plain view exception are satisfied. 
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omitted). In reviewing a probable cause determination, a 
magistrate's decision will be upheld if "the magistrate had a 
substantial basis for . . . [determining] that probable cause 
existed." State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989) 
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S. Ct. 
2317, 2332 (1983)). 
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the affidavit in this 
case is sufficient. Taken as a whole, the affidavit establishes 
that the affiant relied on his own and upon Fox's investigation 
and observations of defendant's conduct; that defendant had 
purchased several items which were known to be used in the 
manufacture of methamphetamine; that defendant gave false 
information as to where he resided, and when questioned about the 
Intertech purchase; and that Garza, with whom defendant shared 
the apartment, and who was arrested at the same time based upon 
the same facts as defendant, had previously been convicted for 
conspiracy to manufacture and distribute illegal substances. See 
State v. Stromberg. 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah App. 1989) (probable 
cause determination supported by fact that defendant has 
previously been convicted of similar offense), cert, denied, 795 
P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). These facts, taken together, support the 
trial court's determination that probable cause existed for the 
issuance of the search warrant. 
CONCLUSION 
We hold that the stop and subsequent warrantless search of 
defendant's vehicle, defendant's arrest, and the warrant search 
of defendant's home did not violate his rights, and therefore, 
the trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion to suppress 
the evidence found as a result of those searches was not clearly 
erroneous. The conviction is affirmed. 
RUSSON, Judge (concurring in the result): 
I concur in the result of the main opinion, but write 
separately because I prefer a different analytical approach to 
reach the same result. I would hold that probable cause to 
arrest Leonard existed at the time at which the officers stopped 
900560-CA 15 
Leonard's vehicle. The facts which support probable cause 
include: (1) evidence that the continuing surveillance had 
resulted in several arrests and convictions relating to the 
possession and manufacture of methamphetamine; (2) Officer Fox's 
observation that Leonard's dress and manner were suspiciously 
inconsistent with those of a legimate businessman; (3) the Datsun 
truck's attempt to block Officer Fox from following Leonard; 
(4) Leonard's evasive driving manner, including driving at 
excessive speeds and making numerous illegal lane changes; 
(5) Leonard's apparent attempt to signal the occupants of the 
Datsun truck by waving bandanna-type flags out the window; 
(6) Officer Fox's discovery that no owner was registered for the 
license plates on the vehicle that Leonard was driving; and 
(7) the fact that Officer Caldwell had learned from Intertech 
what items had been purchased by Leonard and his companion, in 
concert with Officer Caldwell's knowledge that the said items are 
commonly used in the manufacture of methampetamine. On the basis 
of these facts, I would hold that the officers had probable cause 
to arrest Leonard when they stopped his vehicle, and that 
therefore the trial court properly denied Leonard's motion to 
suppress. Accordingly, I agree that Leonard's conviction should 
be affirmed. 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
ORME, Judge (dissenting): 
In its brief, the State does not contend that there was 
probable cause to arrest defendant or subject him to anything 
more intrusive than a level-two Terry stop at the time the police 
officers effected the stop and asked their initial questions. 
Accordingly, the debate on appeal was principally directed to 
whether the police officers possessed the articulable suspicion 
necessary to justify a level-two encounter. I agree the officers 
had the requisite articulable suspicion to warrant a level-two 
stop. It does not follow, however, that what the officers 
actually effected was a proper level-two stop. Given the 
intrusive tactics employed by the investigating officers, I 
believe the main opinion errs in determining that the initial 
seizure was a level-two stop and not a de facto arrest requiring 
probable cause. 
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According to the record, the police officers stopped 
defendant because they suspected him of committing a non-violent 
felony—possession of equipment used in the manufacture of 
controlled substances. There were four police officers present, 
and three police cars, while only defendant and his female 
companion occupied the stopped vehicle. The stop occurred along 
the shoulder of a well-traveled highway, apparently during 
daylight.1 At no time prior to the stop had the officers seen 
defendant or his companion in possession of a weapon, and the 
record provides no indication that the police had anything more 
than a pre-stop hunch that defendant might be dangerous. When 
defendant's vehicle came to a halt on the shoulder of the 
highway, defendant voluntarily exited the vehicle and walked 
toward the police cars. There is no evidence that defendant made 
furtive gestures, carried himself suspiciously, or otherwise 
approached the police in anything but a cooperative, non-violent 
manner.2 
Nonetheless, Officer Fox testified that before questioning 
defendant, he ordered defendant to kneel down at the side of the 
highway. The female occupant of defendant's vehicle was placed 
in one of the police cars. Further, although neither Officer Fox 
nor Officer Caldwell recalled specifically whether any of the 
police officers drew their guns at the time they made the stop, 
Officer Fox claimed it was "very possible" guns were drawn, and 
Officer Caldwell stated that he "hoped" at least one of the 
officers had drawn his gun. Finally, Officer Fox testified that 
before questioning defendant, Officer Caldwell advised defendant 
of his Miranda rights. 
A Terry stop "involves no more than a brief stop, 
interrogation, and, under the proper circumstances, a brief check 
for weapons." United States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 780 (9th 
1. Although the record does not state the time of the stop, 
other facts—i.e., that, just prior to the stop, officers had 
been conducting surveillance at a wholesale establishment open 
for business, and that officers clearly saw bandannas being waved 
from defendant's vehicle—indicate that the stop took place 
during daylight hours. 
2. It would thus appear that any pre-stop concern the officers 
had about the potential dangerousness of defendant would have 
been largely dispelled by his non-confrontational approach. Any 
lingering concern could have been dispelled by a simple pat down 
of the sort permitted by Terry. 
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Cir. 1987). Anything beyond such a brief and narrowly-defined 
intrusion constitutes a de facto arrest, and probable cause is 
required. See id.; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 
S. Ct. 2248, 2254 (1979). The accepted rule is that what might 
have otherwise been a level-two stop evolves into a level-three 
de facto arrest when, in view of all the circumstances, a 
reasonable, innocent person in the suspect's place would believe 
himself to be under arrest. See United States v. Pinion, 800 
F.2d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 936, 107 S. 
Ct. 1580 (1987). See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502, 
103 S. Ct. 1319, 1326-27 (1983) (characterizing relevant inquiry 
as whether the suspect believed he was being detained). 
Accordingly, in the course of a valid Terry stop the police may 
not, as a matter of routine, utilize methods which might commonly 
be employed incident to arrest. 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 9.2(d) at 366 (2d ed. 1987). 
There is, however, one exception to this general 
proscription against intrusive police conduct. Police are 
permitted to employ a show of force or other exceptional methods 
during a Terry stop when such measures are reasonably necessary 
for the protection and safety of the investigating officers.3 
3. For situations in which police officers may draw weapons 
while effecting a stop, see, e.g., United States v. Jones, 759 
F.2d 633, 638-39 (8th Cir.) (drawing weapons is permissible part 
of vehicle stop "if the police action is reasonable under the 
circumstances," taking into consideration "the number of officers 
and police cars involved, the nature of the crime and whether 
there is reason to believe the suspect might be armed, the 
strength of the officers' articulable, objective suspicions, the 
erratic behavior of or suspicious movements by the persons under 
observation, and the need for immediate action by the 
officers . . . . " ) , cert, denied, 474 U.S. 837, 106 S. Ct. 113 
(1985); United States v. Narai. 732 F.2d 1102, 1106 (2d Cir. 
1984) (display of weapons does not transform stop into arrest 
when suspected crime is a serious felony and stop was made in an 
isolated area); United States v. Jacobs, 715 F.2d 1343, 1345-46 
(9th Cir. 1983) (drawing weapon acceptable when vehicle's 
occupant is suspected of bank robbery and is possibly under the 
influence of drugs, and the police officer is alone). 
For situations in which police officers may require a 
suspect to lay down on the ground, see, e.g., United States v. 
Laing, 889 F.2d 281, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (when suspect ran 
toward apartment for which police had a warrant to search for 
guns and drugs, and suspect put his hand into his pants, it was 
acceptable for police to force suspect to lie on the floor), 
cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 1790 (1990); United States v. Taylor, 
(continued...) 
However, even then, the investigating officers must employ the 
least intrusive means reasonably available to effect the purpose 
of the stop. See Royer, 103 S. Ct. at 1325 (recognizing that, 
although permissible level of intrusion will vary with 
circumstances, least intrusive means must always be employed). 
I agree that, in the instant case, the State has set forth 
sufficient facts to support a finding that the police had 
reasonable suspicion to stop defendant and make a level-two 
inquiry. However, given the circumstances of the encounter, I do 
not believe those same facts support a finding that the intrusive 
methods used by the police were necessary to protect the officers 
during the stop.4 The State has provided no additional evidence 
to justify the officers' conduct.5 Therefore, on the record 
before us, I believe the seizure to have been too intrusive to 
qualify as a level-two stop.6 
3(...continued) 
716 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 1983) (stop not invalid because 
police ordered suspect to lie on the floor, when suspect had 
disobeyed police commands to raise his hands and had made furtive 
gestures); People v. Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14, 409 N.E.2d 958, 962, 
431 N.Y.S.2d 485 (ordering suspect to the floor was permissible 
when suspect was in company of man whom there was probable cause 
to arrest for an armed robbery that had just been committed, and 
police had witnessed a suspicious exchange between that man and 
the suspect), cert, denied. 449 U.S. 1018, 101 S. Ct. 582 (1980). 
4. The officers did not frisk defendant, or otherwise attempt 
to discern if he was carrying a weapon. This strongly suggests 
that, once defendant had been stopped and exited his car, the 
officers did not suspect he was armed. Robertson. 833 F.2d at 
781. Other circumstances of the stop—the highway-side locale, 
the presence of four officers, the non-violent nature of the 
suspected offense, and defendant's non-furtive attempt to 
approach the police vehicles—also indicate the situation was not 
potentially dangerous, and that intrusive tactics were 
inappropriate. 
5. The problem may essentially be a failure by the State, at the 
trial court, to develop the available evidence so as to meet its 
burden of proof. Little attention seems to have been given at 
the evidentiary hearing to what the police did in effecting the 
stop as opposed to what they knew in deciding to effect the stop. 
6. Nonetheless, I might still be willing to view the facts as 
not moving the case from the level-two to the level-three 
pigeonhole if, at the time the seizure occurred, a reasonable, 
(continued...) 
It is the State's burden to show that the seizure it seeks 
to justify was sufficiently limited to satisfy the conditions of 
a level-two stop. United States v. Williams, 714 F.2d 777, 781 
(8th Cir. 1983) (quoting Rover, 103 S. Ct. at 1325-26). See 
United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1985), 
cert, denied. 476 U.S. 1144, 106 S. Ct. 2255 (1986). For the 
reasons discussed above, I believe the State falls short of 
satisfying that burden. See also note 4, supra. Accordingly, I 
would hold that the district court erred in determining defendant 
6(...continued) 
innocent person in defendant's place would not have believed 
himself to be under arrest. See United States v. Pinion, 800 
F.2d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1986), cert, denied. 480 U.S. 936, 107 S. 
Ct. 1580 (1987). I find such a possibility unlikely here. The 
police converged on defendant in three separate cars. The 
initial confrontation was somewhat hostile despite defendant's 
passivity, and may well have included a show of weapons by one or 
more officers. Defendant was ordered to his knees at the side of 
the highway, while his female companion was placed in the back of 
a police vehicle. Defendant was then informed of his Miranda 
rights. It is unlikely that, at this point in the encounter, a 
reasonable person in defendant's position would believe his 
seizure to be less than a level-three custodial one. Other cases 
have reached the same result in similar circumstances. See, 
e.g., United States v. Delaadillo-Velasquez. 856 F.2d 1292, 1295 
(9th Cir. 1988) (Terry-stop of suspected drug dealers held 
invalid when police approached with guns drawn, ordered the 
suspects to lie down in the street, and handcuffed them, since 
the "show of force and detention used in this context are 
indistinguishable from police conduct in an arrest"); Kraus v. 
County of Pierce, 793 F.2d 1105, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 1986) (under 
circumstances in which police turned spotlights on the suspects, 
drew their weapons, and ordered the suspects to drop to their 
knees, a reasonable person would have believed himself to be 
under arrest), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 932, 107 S. Ct/1571 
(1987) . 
was subjected to a valid level-two stop, reverse the denial of 
defendant's suppression motion,7 and remand with instructions to 
permit withdrawal of his guilty plea. 
Gregory^. Orme, Judge 
7. The evidence seized from the car and from defendant's home is 
tainted by the illegality of his "arrest" on less than probable 
cause• Probable cause came into existence only when defendant 
made incriminating statements when in custody, but such custody 
was improper where it was supported by nothing more than an 
articulable suspicion. 
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ORDER 
Case No, 900560-CA 
Before Judges Orme, Jackson, and Russon. 
The court has considered the state's petition for 
rehearing. The opinion issued ruled in favor of the state. 
The petition requests that a footnote be deleted. The footnote 
has no bearing on the result of the opinion. Revision or 
deletion of the footnote will not materially affect the result 
of this case. The petition is accordingly denied. See Utah R. 
App. P. 35. However, the author has elected to revise the 
footnote. A copy of the opinion as revised is attached. 
Dated this y day of January 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Norman H. C^ cksorT^  Judge 
'-Leonard H. Russon, ^ Judge 
ORME, J. (concurring): 
I concur in the decision to deny rehearing, but on a 
slightly different rationale. The focus of the petition is a 
single footnote in Judge Jackson's opinion. However, no other 
member of the panel joined in that opinion. Three separate 
opinions were written, none of which has precedential value, 
and none of those opinions can be taken as "the opinion of the 
court." It follows that granting a rehearing with the limited 
objective of revising one of those opinions is not in the 
interest of judicial economy or development of the law. 
Gregory^K. Orme, Judg^ 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case Number 88-CR-0042 
88-CR-0043 
RULING 
FOSTER LEONARD and APRIL GARZA, 
Defendants. 
******** 
This matter came before the Court on the August 29, 
1989 hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained 
from the arrest of above entitled defendants, and the subsequent 
search of defendants1 vehicle and place of residence. Sherry 
Ragan appeared for the State. Both defendants were present c id 
represented by counsel. Defendant Leonard was represented by Jay 
Fitt and defendant Garza was represented by Dean Zabriskie. 
Witnesses were called and evidence was presented. The Court, 
having carefully considered all the evidence enters now its: 
RULING 
From approximately May 1, 1989, law enforcement 
agencies had been conducting suveillance at Intertech Chemical in 
Orem Utah. The surveillance has resulted in a number of arrests 
and convictions. On July 20, 1989, Detective Terry Fox was 
conducting surveillance at Intertech. He noticed defendant 
Leonard in the parking lot wearing casual clothes and using what 
appeared to be a personal vehicle rather than a company vehicle. 
Leonard behaved in a nervous manner. He purchased what looked to 
the detective to be glassware and chemicals and appeared to pay 
in cash. Defendants loaded the glassware and chemicals in to the 
vehicle and left the parking lot. 
Detective Fox decided to follow the vehicle in order to 
identify its owner. As Fox attempted to follow the vehicle, 
another car swerved in front of Fox in an apparent attempt to 
disrupt his progress. It appeared to Fox that the defendants' 
vehicle was trying to evade pursuit. Fox noted reckless behavior 
on the part of the defendants as they turned to get on the 
freeway that nearly caused an accident. On the freeway, the 
defendants' accelerated to over 70 miles per hour in a 55 miles 
per hour zone. 
Detective Fox called for back up after a check through 
dispatch found no owner registered for either the plates of the 
defendants' vehicle nor for the vehicle that swerved in front of 
him. The vehicle was stopped without incident after the backup 
arrived. The officers on the scene then arrested the defendants 
and gave the appropriate Miranda warnings. Defendants were 
interviewed separately concerning what they had purchased and the 
purpose for which they had purchased it. They gave the officers 
different stories—but both indicated that they were purchasing 
the equipment for someone else. Defendant Leonard at first gave 
a false identification and date of birth. Over $2,000 was found 
in defendant Garza's purse. 
Prior to the arrest of the defendants and the search of 
the vehicle, the officers had made contact with Intertech and 
were told what the defendants had purchased. The items found in 
the vehicle—including glassware and chemicals—matched the 
description of the merchandise given by Intertech. The vehicle 
contained items frequently used in the manufacture of 
methamphetamine. Defendant Garza gave two different addresses as 
her own. After checking with Mountain Bell, the officers found 
that one of the addresses given had a phone listed in her name. 
Based upon the information given above, a search warrant was 
served on defendant Garzafs residence. Numerous "listed" 
chemicals and drug paraphernalia were found. 
The Court finds that the stop made by the officers was 
appropriate and legal. Detective Fox had reasonable suspicion 
based on the circumstances taken as a whole. The defendants did 
not appear to be ordinary businessmen; they appeared to be 
nervous; they drove erratically; they used what appeared to be a 
personal vehicle; another car seemed to be acting in concert with 
defendants in an attempt to block the detective's pursuit; 
dispatch could not identify owner of the the vehicle from the 
license plate number; the defendants were traveling more than 15 
miles per hour in excess of the speed limit; the list of items 
purchased given to the officers while in pursuit were indicative 
of illegal activity. All of these factors taken together could 
easily create a reasonable and articulateble suspicion necessary 
to make an investigatory stop. 
Defendants were properly given their Miranda warnings. 
Even before the officers began investigatory questioning which 
does not require it, defendants were given Miranda warnings. 
Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1170 (1983). 
The Court believes the search of the defendants1 
vehicle was proper. The list of items purchased from Intertech 
received while the officers were in pursuit, combined with the 
suspicious behavior of the defendants, and all attendant 
circumstances, created probable cause for search of the vehicle. 
Even if the search was improper, the illegality would not affect 
the legality of the search warrant. The reasoning of the Court 
is that information relative to the evidence found in the vehicle 
was available to the officers in the form of a purchase order 
from Intertech. 
The chemicals and equipment found in the defendants' 
vehicle and on the purchase order from Intertech were commonly 
used together in the making of methamphetamine. In fact 
testimony indicated that the materials found lacked only one 
specialized piece of glassware and some other chemicals to allow 
one to easily make methamphetamine. Also, such equipment is 
rarely used in conjunction to make anything other than 
methamphetamine. The officers, being aware of the facts above, 
had probable cause to make the arrest. 
The Court believes that there was sufficient probable 
cause for the issuance of the search warrant based on the conduct 
of the defendants and the purchase order from Intertech. This 
probable cause was enhanced by the statements of the defendants 
relative to the intended use of the supplies obtained from 
Intertech and the false information given relative to living 
quarters and identity. 
For the reasons given above, the Court finds that the 
stop of the defendants1 vehicle, the subsequent questioning of 
the defendants, and the issuance of the search warrant were 
proper. Therefore, the Court denies defendants motion to 
suppress. 
DATED in Provo, this / 9day of October, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
GEORGE BC BALLIF, JUDG 
cc: Dean Zabriskie 
Jay Fitt 
Sherry Ragan 
APPENDIX 3 
Controlling Constitutional & Statutory Provisions 
TEXT OF CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Amendment IV to the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah similarly 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1990) provides: 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority 
of a warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in 
the presence of any peace officer; "presence" includes 
all of the physical senses or any device that enhances 
the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, 
or records the observations of any of the physical 
senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony 
has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe 
that the person arrested has committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the 
person has committed a public offense, and there is 
reasonable cause for believing the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission 
of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property 
belonging to another person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990) provides: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he 
has committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
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